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Special Operations Forces as a Rapid Prototyping Laboratory
Leo Blanken and Philip Swintek
Introduction
The US military’s once-secure technological lead is slipping away. Peer competitors 
have developed clever strategies to exploit the US lead, while making significant 
progress in their own right.1 Further, the technology landscape is moving away from 
large, centralized research efforts toward small, diffused networks of technological 
innovation. The Department of Defense seems to be finally waking up to the fact that 
it needs to develop novel strategies for navigating the relationship between emerging 
technology and national security.2
We propose one such strategy in this chapter. In brief, we argue the unique nature 
of special operations forces (SOF) offers a rich opportunity to be leveraged as a “rapid 
prototyping laboratory” (RPL). This laboratory could serve the development of SOF-
specific capabilities, as well as more wide-ranging capabilities that may be scaled up 
to the general-purpose forces.3 
In an RPL construct, SOF units and activities could serve as a test bed for new 
technologies, concepts, and practices. These activities could easily be conducted 
by employing the logic of inductive inquiry, natural experimentation, and field 
experimentation to provide structure and rigor to the prototyping activities. The 
proposed innovation challenges for testing could be curated from across the joint 
force. Professional military education (PME) institutions are the perfect locations for 
the curation and refinement of such research questions, as well as for designing and 
executing the RPL processes. 
SOF have many attractive qualities that make them ideal living laboratories for 
the rapid prototyping of innovation challenges. First, SOF forces are continuously 
distributed to the most operationally relevant locales around the globe. No 
matter the topic one is interested in—from peer competitors, nonstate threats, 
partner force operations, or any of a host of irregular challenges—SOF units are 
deployed to such an environment. Second, SOF forces are the most capable of 
weaving research activities into their operations. Through their careful selection 
and training processes and lean organizational design, SOF possess the cognitive 
and operational flexibility to integrate prototyping nimbly and responsibly. Through 
thoughtful planning that leverages a dedicated network of PME-based researchers 
and “customers,” the joint force could fruitfully utilize SOF units as a global 
laboratory for innovation.
In this chapter, we first set the stage by discussing the Department of Defense’s 
legacy system of innovation, and how it fit appropriately with the technological and 
strategic landscape of the Cold War through the example of the “Second Offset.” 
We then sketch the current technological and strategic landscape, showing how the 
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Second Offset legacy innovation system can no longer keep pace with demands. 
Next, we explicate our argument in two steps: explaining the logic of rapid prototyping 
and showing its natural fit to a partnership between SOF and PME entities. Finally, 
we provide some concrete examples that deliver a robust “proof of concept” of 
SOF operators who have—through their own entrepreneurship—already started the 
rapid prototyping endeavor called for above. Our proposal seeks simply to scale up, 
systematize, and hyperenable such entrepreneurship.
Legacy System of the Cold War, and Why It No Longer Works
World War II taught the United States that success in modern warfare is inextricably 
linked to applied science and technological innovation.4 The total nature of the 
conflict made clear that systems needed to be built to access expertise from across 
the entire society to produce the innovation necessary for the nation’s security.5 The 
system designed to generate innovation for US national security reflected the scale 
and centralization of the industrial-age warfare in which it was born6 and proved to be 
a useful tool in offsetting the size advantage enjoyed by Warsaw Pact conventional 
forces throughout the Cold War.7 
The centralized structure of innovation during the Cold War can be likened to a 
lighthouse: a tall vertical structure from which a single beam emanates at the top. 
In such a construct, the leadership at the top of the lighthouse surveys the strategic 
environment to drive innovation requirements. The leadership then, in turn, directs 
the subordinated structure of the lighthouse to provide the needed innovations.
This approach to innovation worked during the Cold War for a number of reasons. 
First, military and political leaders understood their opponent well. The United 
States well understood the force and bureaucratic structures, Warsaw Pact alliance, 
and political goals of the Soviet Union, as they largely mirrored those of the United 
States. This provided a useful framework from which force planning, intelligence, 
and doctrinal needs could be deduced.8 Second, the US national security apparatus 
had a firm grasp of the trajectory and nature of the technologies that would be 
relevant on the battlefield. Nuclear weapons aside, all force structures during the 
Cold War were improved versions of the platforms and doctrine of World War II. 
In fact, the Cold War period maintained the uninterrupted track record of the US 
defense establishment driving the technological landscape, as every single major 
technological advance in the United States to that point had relied on Defense 
dollars for the basic research.9 More specifically, to control technological innovation 
in this period, the Department of Defense funded universities, government 
laboratories, and the relevant units and organizations within the services.10
The crowning achievement of this era of US military innovation, the “Second 
Offset” wedded doctrine and technologies designed to prevent numerically superior 
Warsaw Pact forces from swamping NATO defenses in central Europe.11 Through a 
carefully orchestrated combination of primary research, applied research, and field 
experimentation wedded with coevolved doctrinal concepts, the United States solved 
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this problem. Stealth aircraft, advanced sensors, and precision-guided munitions 
were the technological innovations necessary to enable the AirLand Battle doctrine 
of the 1980s.12 This series of technical achievements constituted an innovative 
solution to a well-understood and highly salient military scenario. In this case, 
the “lighthouse” discerned the strategic problem and effectively generated the 
innovations necessary to answer it.
None of the conditions that enabled the “lighthouse” to work during the Cold War 
holds true anymore. Rather than facing a single, well-understood threat, the United 
States faces a large number of heterogeneous and poorly understood challenges, 
which range from the enduring scourge of violent nonstate actors to emerging 
regional threats and peer competitors determined to contest the United States in 
asymmetric and nontraditional ways.13 Further, the pace of technological change 
vastly outstrips that of the Cold War, and, for the first time in American history, 
basic technologies are being developed outside the control of the Department of 
Defense.14 Finally, while the United States has been focused on its global war on 
terrorism, its chief rivals on the global stage—namely China and Russia—have 
begun to outpace US military innovation and technology.15 
Therefore, the legacy “lighthouse” model of innovation is no longer sufficient. 
Future innovation efforts should look more like a “Christmas tree.” In this metaphor, 
the bright star at the top of the Christmas tree would fulfill the function of the 
original lighthouse beam; it would focus on well-understood and agreed-upon 
requirements. The rest of the tree, however, is also strung with lights. These strings 
of Christmas lights represent innovation efforts diffused throughout the enterprise. 
Rather than innovation being compartmentalized in a reductionist division of labor, 
innovation efforts can be encouraged and enabled throughout the force. Further, 
given the inherent asymmetric and decentralized structure of SOF, these units are 
perfectly suited to the Christmas-tree model of innovation and could constitute the 
first string of lights on the tree. 
What a Rapid Prototyping Laboratory Looks Like
The Secretary of Defense’s advisory Defense Innovation Board (DIB) recommends the 
following changes to foster innovation: 
Test various possibilities of employing different practices to seek out 
empirical evidence, . . . [to be] rapid, iterative, and risk-tolerant. Instead 
of giving processes pride of place . . . focus on outcomes, and how to 
get there most efficiently. These practices should be generalized, and 
not only to products and services, but potentially to strategies and 
operations as well.16
There are a number of such voices calling for fast, iterative feedback loops 
between operational experiences on one hand and providers of material solutions 
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on the other. Such an approach to military innovation can generally be labeled “rapid 
prototyping.”17 Actionable plans to instantiate rapid prototyping, however, remain 
lacking. Some refer to rapid prototyping as a “mindset” or “culture” that needs to 
be inculcated throughout the force.18 Others seek to rely on nascent technologies to 
make the process work: “Immediate feedback will pour into a data lake where the 
latest methods in machine learning and artificial intelligence can improve operational 
effectiveness.”19 We propose a specific set of established methodologies, married to a 
specific set of operationally deployed units to implement rapid prototyping immediately 
and effectively. 
The first task is to concretize “rapid prototyping,” turning it from a buzzword to 
specific and well-established research techniques. We offer three such analytic tools 
that can be implemented readily: field experimentation, natural experimentation, and 
inductive reasoning. 
Experiments are designed to establish control. In other words, experiments 
allow the researcher to isolate the independent effect of various factors upon some 
outcome. Field experimentation refers to conducting such research in “a naturalistic 
setting and manner . . . as a hedge against unforeseen threats to inference that 
arise when drawing generalizations from results obtained in laboratory settings.”20
The common usage of “field experimentation” across the joint force does not 
fit this definition, as it usually refers to the observation of nascent technologies 
being demonstrated in an empty field on some US military base. Often, by the time 
innovations are actually integrated into field exercises for conventional forces, they 
have been acquired and integrated into force structure. Actual field experimentation 
would allow the researcher to contend with all the potential confounding factors 
created by actual encounters with opposing forces in the actual settings in which 
innovations are designed to operate,21 which would require as many aspects of a 
“down range” setting as possible. Globally deployed SOF missions provide a perfect 
locale for such field fermentation.
Natural experiments can be considered a subset of field experiments. In these 
cases, control over potential confounding factors occur naturally in the environment. 
For example, if US forces are operating in two provinces of Afghanistan that are 
strikingly similar across a number of attributes, an innovation may be tested in only 
one of those provinces (rather than multiple iterations of costly tests in multiple 
areas). Such a design would not only be economical but also provide a large degree of 
control, thereby generating stronger inferences regarding the impact of the potential 
innovation under scrutiny. Given restrictions on “random assignment” within military 
operations, sensitivity to naturally occurring experimental opportunities is paramount 
in leveraging this logic.22
Finally, inductive reasoning refers to the process of inferring general laws or 
principles from the observation of particular instances (as opposed to relying on 
preexisting theory to derive conclusions, as is done through deductive reasoning).23 
In other words, inductive reasoning relies on discerning trends or patterns within 
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naturally occurring data. Though this seems the simplest of the three methods 
discussed here—colloquially referred to as “lessons learned”—the US military has 
struggled to learn systematically from things that it has experienced and observed.24 
This is because of the inherently conservative inclinations of military organizations25 
but also their poor understanding of these two modes of reasoning.26
SOF are an attractive force of choice for implementing a model of this sort for 
the same reasons they are often selected for unique and high-risk missions—
their maturity, education levels, and rigorous selection processes.27 SOF units are 
often more comfortable with risk simply based on the nature of SOF missions.28 
Furthermore, SOF are also consistently deployed across the globe, with forces 
spread across each of the six geographic Combatant Commands. Finally, special 
operators conduct a wide array of missions—from near-peer competition, to direct-
action counterterrorism and working closely with partner forces—ergo, they are 
postured to explore an equally wide range of innovation challenges.
Collaborative partners will be necessary to conduct rapid prototyping endeavors. 
While forward deployed SOF offer an ideal environment to conduct rapid prototyping, 
additional labor and expertise will be necessary to execute these activities. PME 
students may prove to be the ideal partners. As military professionals, they would 
understand the organizational, operational, and strategic contexts in which the 
protyping activities are nested. As graduate students, they could employ research 
techniques they are currently learning in the classroom. Finally, they could 
serve to connect the research to the relevant actors (academic, industry, and 
interagency) across the wider innovation ecosystem.29 Through such a partnership, 
the professional development of PME students would be directly tied to the 
transformation of the force through operationally relevant research projects.30
In the following section we show some examples of specific innovations that have 
been prototyped by special operators. These “naturally occurring” innovation efforts 
show the untapped potential that our proposed endeavor seeks to harness.
SOF’s Natural Affinity for Innovation Prototyping
In recent decades, US SOF has already demonstrated itself as an RPL for emerging 
technology, albeit an unintended one. The benefits of pairing SOF with the 
development, testing, and implementation of emerging or untested technology has 
been shown in a number of cases. We briefly survey three here. First is the use of 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS)–based technology and satellite communication 
(Satcom) during the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan during both the Persian 
Gulf War and the war on terrorism, respectively. Second are the ongoing challenges 
around countering unmanned aerial systems (CUAS). Third is the development of the 
Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK), an innovation spearheaded by PME students, to 
enable collaboration with partner forces. We offer these three examples to show a 
latent rapid prototyping capability that could easily be systematized and expanded to 
great effect. 
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One of the most influential technological advances for the US military in recent 
memory has been the use of GPS technology across all aspects of the Department 
of Defense. GPS technology is not new. As early as the 1960s, the US military used 
a rudimentary version of the technology to guide both ships and aircraft. In 1978, the 
United States increased its GPS capabilities by launching the first Navstar satellite 
constellation, but the system was largely untested in combat until Operation Desert 
Storm, during which US SOF were vital to testing the system in the laboratory of 
combat.31 Specifically, SOF deployed behind enemy lines used GPS technology to 
navigate across the barren desert, conducting special reconnaissance deep in enemy 
territory.32
Undoubtedly, mistakes were made while using a largely untested technology, but 
these mistakes were used to improve techniques and equipment. For example, after 
the Persian Gulf War, the Army dictated that all armored vehicles would carry GPS 
receivers, and the demand for handheld devices, which were primitive by today’s 
standards, surged across the force.33 This increase in demand and utility was partially 
based on the successful use of GPS technology during the ground and air wars waged 
by US forces during this short, but influential, conflict. With these lessons, among 
others, the implementation of GPS technology and its satellite constellation grew and 
improved, and the improved US GPS infrastructure greatly enabled SOF during the 
subsequent conflicts across Afghanistan and Iraq, paving the way for another RPL for 
GPS and SOF.
As detachments of US SOF waged unconventional warfare in the mountains of 
northern Afghanistan, their mission was to advise and assist the freedom fighters of 
the Northern Alliance struggling to resist the Taliban on their own. A key component 
of their mission was to increase the lethality and survivability of the Northern Alliance 
through combat-multiplying technologies such as GPS. Primarily, GPS served two 
purposes during the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001: map the front lines 
and provide guidance to smart bombs. US SOF and operatives from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) traveled along the scattered northern frontlines and used 
GPS to pinpoint friendly and enemy positions in conjunction with laser-guided bombs 
to mark high-value enemy targets for pilots flying overhead.34 This data provided 
valuable intelligence to senior US officials as they planned the larger campaign 
to ouster the Taliban and defeat al-Qaeda. More important, it also demonstrated 
the combat power provided by a handful of secure portable handheld GPS devices 
to senior military leaders and policy makers. Today, handheld GPS technology 
is ubiquitous across the US military. Once again, SOF, and its partners in the 
interagency, served as an RPL to validate technology in a combat laboratory.
Just over a year later in Iraq, the US military used the same GPS technology during 
Operation Viking Hammer. As soldiers from the Tenth Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
blazed their way through Kurdistan and into northern Iraq, they relied heavily on GPS 
to coordinate their efforts.35 SFOD-As from Tenth Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
were spread across the Iraqi frontier as they led their Kurdish partner forces to defeat 
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Saddam Hussein’s army. This swift campaign required precise knowledge of friendly 
positions. Relying on handheld and vehicle-mounted GPS systems, commanders could 
see the positions of their subordinate units with high accuracy. While GPS technology 
supported a highly precise bombing campaign in Afghanistan, in Iraq, it increased 
the freedom of maneuver for friendly forces by supporting decentralized operations. 
Commanders understood the battlefield with a new level of clarity that supported 
the dispersion of forces across large geographic areas—further validating GPS as a 
combat multiplier via a SOF RPL.
Similar to GPS, SATCOM was not new technology during the invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Though widely used throughout the military prior to 2001, it 
was largely untested in combat prior to the war on terrorism. During the onset of 
combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, SATCOM was pervasive as a form of 
communications across the battlefield. The SFOD-As and CIA operatives fighting 
alongside the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan utilized SATCOM to coordinate the 
efforts of their intricate bombing campaign with major ground offensives.36 Using 
man-portable radios on their backs, US forces sent messages via satellites to their 
headquarters located on the other side of the globe. This space-based technology 
was undoubtedly a combat multiplier across the offensive in northern Afghanistan, 
as it directly supported decentralized operations with near-instantaneous global 
connectivity to execute a precision bombing campaign, once again validating 
technology in a combat laboratory via SOF.
In Iraq, the invasion also required constant communications to coordinate 
Operation Viking Hammer. SATCOM allowed US forces to coordinate the efforts of 
an intricate bombing campaign with the unconventional war they were waging on the 
ground.37 SATCOM enabled small and isolated units to coordinate their efforts and 
synchronize combat power. It also allowed for greater geographic dispersion of forces 
across the battlefield, which proved vital as the United States invaded Iraq. During 
the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, SATCOM enabled decentralized, lethal, 
and precise operations that minimized friendly casualties and helped define the new 
American way of war. The value of SATCOM and the operations it fostered was evident 
to leaders at the highest level thanks to an accidental RPL, with SOF leading the way.
Today, SOF continue to fill the role of an RPL for emerging technology across the 
globe. This has increasingly become the case as US operations have become more 
decentralized, with SOF often in the lead, facing technologically savvy enemies and 
adversaries, from extremist organizations with drones to near-peer competitors waging 
electronic warfare. SOF’s value in the process of developing, testing, and fielding 
innovative and emerging technology has only increased in recent years.
While drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have played a key role in the 
last two decades of conflict across the globe, until recently, they consisted mostly 
of large drones used to drop munitions on remote targets or observe the battlefield. 
However, drone technology has improved, miniaturized, and become more pervasive 
across the globe, as have the threats posed by UAVs. As a result, US adversaries and 
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enemies use commercial off-the-shelf UAVs to disrupt and attack US forces in remote 
corners of the globe. Typically, the forces facing these threats are SOF.
The emerging threat from UAVs has created a demand for counter-UAV (CUAV) 
technology to enable military and law-enforcement personnel to defeat UAV threats. 
Consequently, the market is flooded with CUAV solutions. While the companies 
touting these wares attest to their value and effectiveness, the testing is all limited 
to controlled scenarios often lacking real-world variables (meaning field experiments 
only). However, for the SOF units in Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere facing these 
threats, the threat is real and must be defeated. This paradigm has created a 
perfect SOF RPL, with units on the battlefield fielding and testing CUAV equipment, 
attesting to the validity of said equipment, and ordering more of the successful 
systems and avoiding the ineffective or overly expensive technological blunders. 
Meanwhile, large organizations such as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
or the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) oversee the procurement of systems and 
programs of record to counter this threat. To conceptualize this with an earlier 
example, SOCOM and AWG are the light on top of the Christmas tree, guiding the 
overall process. The SOF detachments, on the other hand, are the Christmas lights 
strung around the tree, facing the threat and driving innovation toward the correct 
solution—an SOF RPL.
However, the CUAV example is missing an important piece of the model we 
developed. While there is an adequate amount of experimentation in the innovation of 
CUAV solutions, it needs to be tied into PME—into field experimentation shepherded 
by SOF professionals as part of their academic professional development. ATAK 
represents one such example. The ATAK is an Android-based operating system 
installed on tablets, cell phones, and other handheld devices that provides real-time 
awareness on the modern battlefield, fosters communication, leverages SATCOM, and 
uses GPS technology. It has proven to be an invaluable tool for SOF across the globe. 
Interestingly, given the ATAK’s success and value, many SOF officers have looked to 
its further development, testing, and implementation while attending PME. Two such 
examples include supporting the development of remote advise-and-assist ATAKs for 
partner forces separated geographically from their American SOF advisors and ways to 
tie the ATAK better into joint-operations centers.38
Taking it one step further, the same SOF students have since completed PME and 
are now using the devices they helped improve on the battlefield, completing the cycle 
of innovation. The innovation and integration of the ATAK by SOF professionals—both 
on the battlefield and during PME—is an example of a successful SOF RPL that has 
supported combat success directly, from testing to field experimentation and natural 
experimentation.
Conclusions
We can now return to the Defense Innovation Board’s recommendations and highlight 
the specific ways in which our proposed initiative satisfies their key points:
330   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
Test various possibilities of employing different practices to seek out 
empirical evidence, . . . [to be] rapid, iterative, and risk-tolerant. 
Instead of giving processes pride of place . . . focus on outcomes, 
and how to get there most efficiently. These practices should be 
generalized, and not only to products and services, but potentially to 
strategies and operations as well39 (emphasis added).
By using SOF as the laboratory for rapid prototyping, our proposal leverages the 
military community most comfortable with the necessary rapidity, cognitive flexibility, 
and risk tolerance. Marrying the SOF laboratory with PME research teams produces 
gains in efficiency, as well as the required analytic rigor for valid empirical testing. 
Finally, these operators and military graduate students are fully capable of applying 
these techniques to endogenize strategic and operational concepts, not just the 
technological “shiny objects” that take precedent in most discussions around 
innovation.
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